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If something cannot go on for ever, states Herbert Stein’s 
law,1 it will stop. In itself this is not very informative, but it 
opens the way to three interesting questions: (1) why can’t it 
go on forever?; (2) where and when will it stop?; and (3) why? 
Generations of economists have applied this line of inquiry to 
the accumulation of wealth (or its narrower version, capital) 
and to its close relative, the share of national income going to 
the holders of wealth. Their answers have varied widely. 
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Adam Smith in 1776 saw no reason why 
accumulation could not go on forever. 
David Ricardo in 1814 thought that the 
growing income claim of unproductive 
rentiers would squeeze capitalists’ returns 
against the immovable barrier of the 
subsistence wage, and eventually bring 
capitalist growth to a halt, in the process 
putting a limit on wealth. Marx in the 
1850s thought that accumulation carried 
the seeds of its own destruction: a rising 
capital–output ratio would drive down 
the profit rate and trigger intensified 
exploitation of labour, leading to class 
conflict that would destroy capitalism 
itself. Keynes in the 1930s predicted 
‘euthanasia of the rentier’ as an increasing 
stock of wealth drove down the rate of 
return. In Solow’s 1956 growth model, 
the combination of diminishing returns 
and the physical fact of depreciation led 
to the prediction that the capital–output 
ratio would stabilise at an equilibrium 
level, with total capital growing only at the 
economy’s rate of growth. Thomas Piketty 
takes this one step further by arguing that 
the wealth/income ratio has a long-run 
equilibrium at a value of around five or six, 
while the long-run return on wealth tends 
to stabilise at a value above the long-run 
growth rate of the economy, producing a 
society with dramatic and sustained long-
run inequality of both wealth and income. 
All (except the pre-Ricardian Smith) agree 
that in a closed-economy setting, ‘too 
much capital’, as Piketty puts it, ‘kills the 
return on capital’ (Piketty, 2014, p.215).
In a key passage in the middle of his 
Holmes Lecture Ross Garnaut singles 
out the relationship between capital 
accumulation and income inequality as 
the ‘question that will be most important 
in shaping global development in the 
21st century’. He argues, echoing Keynes 
in the final chapter of The General 
Theory (Keynes, 1936) that in a world of 
abundant capital and output the long-
run rate of return on capital must fall to 
negligibly low levels. Garnaut interprets 
Keynes’ position as follows: 
abundance will cause the rate of 
return on capital to fall to low levels. 
People who have a lot of capital will 
not have enormous incomes simply 
as a result of that ownership. This 
world will see ‘the euthanasia of the 
rentier’. For those who are interested 
in access to the important things of 
life, there will be an abundance, so 
that questions of inequality will not 
matter very much.
What, then, should we make of the 
recent increase in inequality? Garnaut 
interprets it as merely a short-run hiccup 
due to falling global interest rates. Piketty 
views it as empirical evidence in favour of 
his thesis that global inequality is on track 
to return to 18th-century levels. (Garnaut 
also, in the passage quoted above, proposes 
that inequality matters only in relation to 
‘the important things of life’, by which he 
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seems to mean essentials as distinct from 
luxuries and positional goods. Here I 
think he strains credibility, both because 
the possession of positional goods is a 
crucial part of the inequality story, and 
because his assumption that abundance 
must eventually trickle down to everyone 
requires an unduly big leap of faith.) 
While I agree with Garnaut about the 
importance of the issue, I think he is too 
quick to suggest that ‘Keynes is right and 
Piketty wrong’. In this comment I shall try 
to explore this in a bit more depth.
First off, one has to bear in mind the 
difference between wealth and capital, a 
distinction that Piketty has unhelpfully 
obscured by using the term ‘capital’ to 
refer to the broader category of ‘wealth’. 
Economic growth theories that predict a 
steady (or possibly stationary) state for the 
economy, with a stable equilibrium capital/
output ratio, generally conceive of capital 
as an input to the productive process, 
without which growth itself cannot happen. 
Therefore, a fall in the rate of return on 
capital as it accumulates translates into a 
fall in the incentive to invest, which in turn 
slows accumulation itself. 
There are three familiar limitations 
to this story. The first lies in the concept 
of capital itself, the subject of the 
‘Cambridge debate’ in the 1960s, which 
I will not pursue here. The second is the 
brute fact of depreciation, which means 
that in the steady state of, for example, 
a Solow economy the rate of return on 
investment at the margin cannot fall 
below the rate required to incentivise 
replacement investment to maintain the 
capital stock. This in turn puts a limit on 
the extent to which diminishing returns 
can drive down the rate of return on 
productive capital.2
The third is the fact that (as Keynes, 
Garnaut and Piketty all acknowledge) 
savings do not all automatically become 
embodied in new productive capital. 
There are a wide range of forms in which 
wealth can be accumulated, of which 
productive capital is only one. Landed 
property and buildings are the most 
obvious,3 and confer upon their owners 
the power to collect rent, at a rate of 
return which tends to rise rather than fall 
as productive capital accumulates relative 
to land (Ricardo’s point). 
Financial assets such as government 
bonds are a different form of wealth with 
different dynamics: excess current savings 
drive down the rate of interest at which 
new loans can be made, but in the process 
drive up the value of existing bonds 
issued in the past at higher rates. Garnaut 
attributes the recent rise in inequality to 
this mechanism: ‘much of the increase 
in wealth and income at the top of the 
distribution in this century … reflects 
once-and-for-all increases in asset values 
associated … with the decline in interest 
rates themselves’. Hence, as existing 
loans expire and are rolled over at lower 
interest rates, even a very large portfolio 
of bonds will yield only a meagre income, 
which leads Garnaut to predict that the 
current level of inequality will prove 
unsustainable in the face of abundance of 
capital and a low rate of interest.
Garnaut may eventually turn out to 
have been right, but I would nevertheless 
emphasise three factors that add weight 
to Piketty’s side of the debate.
First, Keynes’ original discussion 
of euthanasia of the rentier (Keynes, 
1936, pp.375-7) was far from all-
encompassing. The rentier whose demise 
he foreshadowed was the ‘functionless 
investor’ who secures rents on financial 
assets only so long as capital remains 
scarce, so that the rate of interest has to 
be at a level sufficient to attract funds to 
net new investment. Keynes expected his 
‘euthanasia of the cumulative oppressive 
power of the capitalist to exploit the 
scarcity value of capital’ (p.376) to flow 
from, and depend directly upon, capital 
abundance, which if necessary was to 
be secured by direct state investment 
sufficient to ensure capital abundance at 
full employment. Keynes acknowledged, 
though, that rent on land is different, 
because ‘there are intrinsic reasons for the 
scarcity of land’ which do not disappear 
simply because of capital abundance. 
Thus, only one category of rentiers 
suffered euthanasia in his account. For 
the others, Keynes was happy to see large 
income and inheritance taxes imposed 
(p.377). Euthanasia by capital abundance, 
in short, was a selective process which 
would leave much wealth untouched in 
the absence of high tax rates.
Second, ‘land’ is shorthand for a large 
range of bottleneck resources that are 
inherently in limited supply and hence 
command sustainable rents in a market 
economy. Social(ist) ownership of these 
resources could prevent them from 
becoming the basis for gross inequality 
of wealth and income, but under private 
ownership there is no obvious endogenous 
tendency for their value to decline, nor 
for their ownership to become dispersed, 
either of which might bring inequality 
down. Hence, those individuals who 
secure ownership at the bottlenecks can 
continue to ride the escalator of rising rent 
and ‘capital gains’.4 Just as Keynes set aside 
this aspect of capital abundance, so does 
Garnaut gloss over the future of land-based 
rentals and the associated inequalities.
Third, Piketty’s position has a long-
run historical grounding which puts 
a considerable onus on Garnaut to 
demonstrate why ‘this time is different’ 
from the two millennia up to 1900. 
In Piketty’s theory of history, the 20th 
century appears as a one-off deviation 
from the long-run human propensity 
to create and sustain highly unequal 
societies. The deviation, in his account, 
was driven by an eruption of new social 
and political forces that broke the power 
Garnaut, following Keynes, views the 
20th century not as a short-run historical 
aberration but as the launching pad for 
a long-run growth path leading to global 
abundance and greater equality.
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of the old ruling elites and established 
a high-tax, high-wage welfare state and 
mixed economy. Those forces faded in 
the late 20th century in the face of the 
resurgence of financial power and neo-
liberal ideology, following which the 
age-old disequalising forces are back and 
will consolidate unless democratic forces 
revive. Hence Piketty thinks we must 
‘bet everything on democracy’ (Piketty, 
2014, p.573); that is, on a new wave of 
deliberate political intervention to block 
the disequalising tendency of the market 
economy.
Garnaut, following Keynes, views the 
20th century not as a short-run historical 
aberration but as the launching pad for 
a long-run growth path leading to global 
abundance and greater equality. In this 
view, the history of inequality prior to 
1900 is an irrelevant distraction, and the 
recent sharp increase in inequality is a 
temporary aberration, from which the 
economies of the developed countries are 
expected to recover of their own accord 
as the rest of the global community 
completes its transitional phase of rapid 
growth and accumulation.
I hope, for obvious reasons, that 
Garnaut is right, but I did not find his 
argument against Piketty persuasive. 
The jury remains out on how the long-
run accumulation story will play, and I 
am uneasy about bringing the authority 
of Keynes to bear in support of the 
proposition that the currently low interest 
rates prevailing in the global economy 
will necessarily prevail into the long run 
– that is, for the coming century – and 
translate into a new period of devaluation 
of wealth. Keynes’ rentiers certainly had 
a thin time of it for half a century after 
The General Theory in the face of strongly 
interventionist policy in the advanced 
economies, but the story of recent 
decades has been one of resurrection of 
the rentier and consolidation of their 
well-funded stranglehold over policy. 
Laissez-faire, this suggests, is not likely to 
prove the best response to inequality. 
This brings me to the question 
of what, if anything, Garnaut thinks 
we ought to do about inequality. His 
optimism about the long-run equalising 
tendency of the market economy, 
and consequent rejection of Piketty’s 
extrapolation of the recent trend towards 
inequality, seems to point to a relaxed 
laissez-faire stance. Yet he argues for 
‘effective government … to run tax 
and expenditure policies that constrain 
inequality in income distribution within 
limits that are consistent with political 
support for growth-sustaining policy’, 
seems to support Piketty’s proposal for a 
global wealth tax, and worries about the 
power of vested interests. As did Keynes 
eight decades ago, Garnaut seems to be 
holding state intervention in reserve, to 
wield the axe if and when the free market 
fails to deliver on his long-run vision of 
euthanasia of the rentier in a world of 
general abundance. I was left wondering 
how long he would be willing to wait 
to see whether the falling interest rate 
(see his Figure 2), on which he lays such 
stress, can indeed be sufficient to reverse 
the recent rise in inequality.
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herbert_Stein. 
2 Keynes makes this point clearly: ‘it would not be difficult to 
increase the stock of capital up to a point where its marginal 
efficiency had fallen to a very low figure. This would not 
mean that the use of capital instruments would cost almost 
nothing, but only that the return on them would have to 
cover little more than their exhaustion by wastage and 
obsolescence together with some margin to cover risk and 
the exercise of skill and judgment’ (Keynes, 1936, p.375).
3 The dominance of housing as a component of total present-
day wealth is conspicuous in Piketty’s statistics and in the 
corresponding New Zealand data (see Bertram, 2015) and 
fits uneasily with his mathematical model of equilibrium 
capital accumulation: see Rognlie, 2015 and Malpass, 
2015. 
4 ‘Capital’ here obviously carries the meaning wealth.
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